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Ontology of the wave function and the many-worlds 
interpretation 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum theory is about a century old, but as the existence of this volume shows, we are far from 
consensus about its interpretation. Science does not develop in a straight line. For a decade, the 
quantum theory had no real basis, only phenomenological equations found by Bohr, who made 
many of us believe until today that quantum mechanics cannot be understood. The relativistic 
generalizations of Schrodinger equation, however, provide a complete elegant physical theory 
fully consistent with experimental data with precision of up to 10 significant digits. The situation 
today is much better than at the time of Lord Kelvin's speech at 1900 in which he was arguing that 
physics is almost finished except for solving “two clouds” which were later to become the theory 
of relativity and quantum theory. This, and the fact that quantum equations describe several 
outcomes for quantum measurements, although we always see just one, are probably the main 
reasons why contemporary physicists are reluctant to state that physics is close to be finished. 
To deal with this second problem we either have to add something to the wave equation, but no 
proposal attractive enough to become a consensus was found, or to admit that what we see is only 
a tiny part of what is and that there are multiple parallel worlds similar to ours. I find that this last 
option is the only reasonable one and I hope it will reach the consensus in the foreseeable future. 
 
2. A toy model of classical mechanics 
Before discussing quantum mechanics, which is clearly not simple since we are very far from 
consensus about its interpretation, I would like to discuss a toy model of classical mechanics. It is 
an implementation of Laplace Universe: 
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and 
as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in 
nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, 
would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as 
well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful 
to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the 
past would be present to its eyes. The perfection that the human mind has been able to give 
to astronomy affords but a feeble outline of such an intelligence.                 [Laplace 1820]                                                                                                                                                                           
I assume that the clouds Lord Kelvin talked about do not exist. Newton laws and Maxwell 
equations are somewhat different and they provide a consistent theory for microscopic particles 
moving on continuous trajectories, which, using the methods of statistical mechanics, explains 
well all experimental data. It is also an assumption about the experimental data, since we know 
that actually observed data cannot be explained by a classical model.  
 In the model we consider the three-dimensional space is given. There are particles moving in well 
defined trajectories and fields spread out in space. Particles create fields which propagate in space 
and change motion of other particles present in locations with nonvanishing fields. The laws of 
creation and propagation of fields explain the existence of stable rigid objects and everything else 
(including ourselves) which we experience with our senses. The behavior of objects is 
deterministic, free will is an illusion.  
Like in actual physics, our model can be presented in a different way. There is a point in 
configuration space of all particles and configuration of fields fulfilling some global equation of 
extremal action. The global laws provide the same solution for trajectories. Both explanations are 
acceptable, but I feel that it is the first presentation with fields locally acting on particles moving 
on trajectories in 3D space that is a more convincing explanation of the world. Existence of a 
global mathematical representation is important, but it hides the local causal story which is what 
is considered as an explanation of motion of micro systems as well as our behavior. 
It seems to me that in a counterfactual universe with successful classical physics as described 
above there will be no philosophical controversy how to describe reality. Particle trajectories 
governed by local forces through fields in three dimension would be a clear consensus. 
 
3. Ontology of collapsed wave function 
Our world is not classical. Numerous experiments, e.g. particle interference, contradict this picture. 
Moreover, Bell-type correlations show that no classical-type local theory, i.e. a theory which 
locally predicts a single outcome for each possible experiment can reproduce observed 
correlations. We have a new theory, quantum mechanics. It is true that the community of physicists 
working in the field of foundations of quantum mechanics have no consensus of its interpretation. 
Many of them (like me) are certain that their favorite view is a satisfactory (or even an excellent) 
solution, but each separate group is a small minority, so the message of the community as a whole 
is that currently there is no good solution. There are many, also outside the foundations community, 
who feel that we need the correct interpretation, but that it is different from all current proposals. 
However, the majority of physicists really think that the problem does not exist and that textbook 
quantum mechanics is satisfactory. It tells us that every time we perform a quantum measurement 
there is a collapse of the quantum wave function and that the collapsed wave function describes 
well all what we see around. Von Neumann proved that the tough question, when exactly collapse 
occurs, need not be answered since whenever we put the cut between classical and quantum, we 
will observe no contradiction with our experience. A vague statement according to which all 
“macroscopic” objects are “well” localized provides a satisfactory criterion.  
Von Neumann collapse is ad hoc without any concrete mechanism. In physical collapse theories, 
Pearle (1976), Ghirardi et al. (1986), Diosi (1987), Penrose (1996), the collapsed wave function 
is not completely identical to that of von Neumann, but it is very close, so also proponents of 
physical collapse theories consider the collapsed wave function as a satisfactory description of 
what we see. Apparently it is the promotion of the wave function ontology in the configuration 
space by Albert (2013) which led to strong criticism.  Maudlin (2013) understandably complained: 
how a mathematical object in high dimensional space can represent our experience in three 
dimensions?  
 
The key to answering this question is the understanding that our experience supervenes on 
macroscopic objects. We do not directly experience the electron wave function in the atoms of our 
body. Parts of our body and our neurons are macroscopic bodies. We needed configuration space 
because of entanglement. While for describing classical particles we had a choice between one 
point in 3N dimensional space or N points in three dimensional space, in the quantum case with 
entanglement the second option does not exist, entanglement requires multidimensional space: 
complete descriptions of all particles separately do not provide complete description of entangled 
particles. But entanglement of quantum systems does not exist for macroscopic systems. In von 
Neumann approach it is absent by definition and in physical collapse theories, the mechanism 
removes entanglement of macroscopic objects very quickly. Without entanglement, we can 
describe all objects in three dimensions. To summarize, analysis of the process of obtaining 
experience from our senses when the universe is described by a collapsed wave function of a 
textbook or by the collapsed wave function of a physical collapse proposal provides an explanation 
similar to that of classical physics: (macroscopic) objects moving in three-dimensional space 
locally trigger sensory organs of observers living in this three dimensional space.  
Current (quantum) physical theory based on minimal action does not always provide a simple local 
explanation of behavior of particles as our gedanken classical model. The basic concept of 
quantum theory is potentials which are not measurable locally. Classical physics also uses 
potentials, but they are just auxiliary tools helping to solve various problems more efficiently. In 
classical physics operational meaning of potentials is that their derivatives provide observable 
forces. In quantum mechanics Aharonov-Bohm effect (1959) teaches us that potentials provide a 
direct physical effect: particle moving in a free-field region behaves differently depending on the 
potentials present there.  At least for myself, I resolved the difficulty, Vaidman (2012a), finding a 
local explanation of the AB effect based on considering the source of the potential to be quantum 
and taking into account entanglement between the electron and the source. This explanation 
removed the proof that quantum theory based on direct action of local fields cannot exist. I opened 
the way to such a theory, which, if constructed, will be conceptually more satisfactory than the 
present one.  
 
4. Against collapse 
Nonlocality of the Aharonov-Bohm effect makes a physical explanation more sophisticated, but 
the main ugly scar of quantum mechanics is collapse. I want to believe that today’s physics by and 
large correctly explains everything we see around. For this belief I need two ingredients. First, that 
predictions of the theory correspond to what we see, i.e. to be confirmed by experimental results. 
Second, that the theory is elegant enough to believe that this is the description of Nature. We have 
had incredible success of the first part. In all cases we can calculate and measure, there is a 
complete agreement and sometimes, with astronomical precision of more than ten digits. There are 
no “clouds” similar to those seen by Lord Kelvin in classical physics. There is also incredible 
success of the theory. All basic laws of physics can be written on a t-shirt. Today’s quantum 
mechanics (even with potentials) is a good theory: it is deterministic and it does not have action at 
a distance. Only the collapse spoils it. It is the only random process in physics.  
 
The collapse is sometimes considered to be in “peaceful coexistence” with special relativity. 
Indeed, we cannot send superluminal signals using the collapse process. But it is an action at a 
distance. A particle described by a superposition of wave packets in two separate locations leads 
to action at a distance when the presence of a particle in one location is measured. The complete 
quantum description of a region of space with the second wave packet before the measurement is 
a mixed state. It has the following operational meaning: everyone, everywhere, have a well-defined 
betting strategy on the result of a measurement testing the presence of the particle in this place. 
Measurement in the location of the first wave packet changes the situation immediately. Obviously 
so, if the wave function is an ontic entity, since it is changed by a remote action, but also if it is 
only an epistemic concept. There is a change in operational meaning. If I and you are in the location 
of the first wave packet, you are ready to bet with me on the result of the remote measurement, but 
this changes immediately after you observe that I made a measurement on the first wave packet.  
 
Contrary to widespread belief, there is no evidence for collapse of the wave function. It is true that 
for every quantum experiment we observe one outcome, while a theory without collapse has a 
wave function corresponding to several outcomes. But to be considered evidence, we need for the 
theory to predict a different experience in case the collapse takes place or not. The theory does not 
predict this. In fact, looking on a wave function of quantum mechanics without collapse it is not 
easy to make any prediction about experience. We need to add some postulates to connect the 
ontology with our experience. 
 
5. Connecting ontology with our experience 
Let us start the analysis with an interpretation of quantum mechanics where the connection is 
simple. In Bohmian mechanics, Goldstein (2017), the postulate is that experience supervene on 
Bohmian positions of particles and the wave function is only a pilot wave of these particles. Then, 
the Bohmian picture of positions of all particles is similar to the gedanken classical theory I 
sketched above. All particles provide a familiar picture of what we see around us drawn in three 
dimensions in a pointillist style. Bohmian particles, according to Bohmian mechanics postulates, 
are distributed in the locations of a nonvanishing wave function according to the Born rule. But 
the size of the atoms and thus the size of the wave packets of elementary particles are so small that 
the difference between locations of Bohmian points, and centers of particle’s wave packets is 
inessential. Thus, considering the centers of the wave functions of particles in the collapsed wave 
function also provides a familiar picture. The fact that most of elementary particles are entangled 
and do not have a pure state, does not spoil this picture. Their mixed states are still well localized 
on the atom scale, so the expectation value of their positions are not far from corresponding to 
Bohmian positions.  
 
Bohmian particles describe a world which looks like the one we observe and also the collapsed 
wave function does. Because the wave functions of macroscopic objects are well localized, the 
picture drawn by the expectation values of the position vectors of all particles of these objects also 
provides a familiar picture. The particles are very close to each other, so we do not observe the 
points. We observe the smoothed picture of everyday objects: tables, cats, people, etc.; the 
collapsed wave function provides a familiar picture of the world. The theory has a tacit assumption, 
a postulate: our everyday experience supervenes on the collapsed wave function. Since the picture 
drawn by the particles and the picture we draw based on our experience are so similar, we usually 
forget that we make an assumption connecting the formalism with experience. The theory is 
supposed to describe our experience. In this theory there is only one picture which looks like the 
world we see, we assume that there is only one world, so naturally we connect them. But the 
postulate is needed, since there can be other options: we can imagine presence of Bohmian particles 
also in a theory which makes collapses and attach experience to Bohmian particles. It is a different 
rule, although it seems to provide essentially the same experience. 
 
6. Connecting ontology with experience in the framework of the MWI 
In quantum mechanics without collapse we must add a postulate to connect to our experience since 
mathematics does not provide a (unique) picture corresponding to what we see around. 
My postulate will be the following. The universe with non-collapsing wave function corresponds 
to multiple experiences. Each experience should correspond to at least one world, the definition of 
the concept of a world does not allow multiple simultaneous experiences of a person in a world. 
To connect the wave function of the Universe to our experience we need first to decompose the 
wave function of the Universe to a superposition of wave functions of worlds. 
 i iUNIVERSE WORLD
i
     (1) 
 The wave function of a world  i  must be of a particular type. Probably the most informative 
definition is that this is the type of wave functions which might appear in the textbook: "collapsed 
wave function of the Universe". Without relying on textbook definition, this type of wave function 
can be defined by the property that all macroscopic objects must be well localized.  Both 
definitions are vague. We usually require rigor and precision in our theories. However, it must be 
so when we consider exact sciences. The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) has two clearly 
separated parts: i) a precise physical theory of evolution of the wave function of the Universe  
UNIVERSE
  and ii) connection of this universal wave function to our experience(s).  In classical 
theory, in Bohmian theory, in quantum mechanics with collapse, the separation between the two 
parts of theory was not emphasized because the second part was very simple: the connection is 
natural and obvious in contrast to the MWI, where the second part is significant. But I believe that 
the connection implicitly taken in single-world theories can be directly adopted to the MWI, and 
vagueness of the splitting of the worlds is much less problematic than the vagueness of the answer 
to the question when does collapse occur. Our experiences cannot be described in terms of exact 
science. So, it is understandable and acceptable that the concepts belonging to the second part of 
the theory are not rigorously defined. The wave function of a world has the following form 
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of the remaining  particles which are not part of macroscopic objects. The terms “macroscopic”, 
“well localized” might be chosen as more or less “fine grained”, so the decomposition (1) is only 
approximately defined.  
It seems to me that I can stop here. Textbook quantum theory is a well established and well tested 
theory which explains well everything we see around. It includes the unphysical process of 
collapse which makes it very difficult to believe that it is true. I remove the collapse and use the 
same postulate of connection to our experience. Now, the theory is a good physical theory 
(deterministic, no action at a distance and no ad hoc rules). The postulate of the correspondence of 
the experience with the wave function of the type of the universal wave function of a collapsed 
world makes the experience by fiat identical to that of an experience of an observer living in a 
Universe with collapsing wave functions. However, I know that this picture is (still) not in a 
consensus. I need to persuade the community that it is consistent. 
 
7. Naïve criticism 
The most naïve criticism is that we do not have experimental evidence for the MWI. How all these 
numerous worlds can be present in the same space as our world without usu noticing their 
presence? Equations tell us that there is no interaction between objects in different worlds. 
Moreover, we see in the laboratory that for micro systems, there is no scattering between wave 
packets of the same electron. Note that we also have no experimental evidence for the existence 
of collapse. Testing MWI versus collapse theories will be the performance of a quantum 
experiment up to a stage that the collapse proponents accept that collapse must have happened and 
then to undo the experiment Deutsch (1986) Vaidman (1998). If we get the original state every 
time we perform this procedure, it is proof that collapse did not take place.  Until today there is no 
sign of a collapse, but we are very, very far from a decisive experiment. If collapse proponents 
will claim that collapse happens only after we write the result of a quantum experiment in a 
notebook, it can never be tested. Of course, it is the MWI that cannot be proved. If collapse exists 
on an early stage, it will be observed (Although it will not be easy to persuade opponents that the 
explanation of the signal is not a failure of experimentalists to prevent decoherence).  
 
Slightly less naive criticism is the problem of preferred basis. Mathematically, one can decompose 
the wave function of the Universe into a superposition of orthogonal components not just as (1), 
but in many other ways which will not provide a familiar world’s picture in every branch. So, the 
critics might say that the proposal is circular: I define by fiat what I want to explain. First, a simple 
definition which is confirmed by observation sounds to me a legitimate strategy. But there is also 
a more specific answer. The basis of the decomposition is indeed preferred. Until now I have not 
mentioned time evolution. Everything was considered at a particular moment. But we cannot 
experience anything at zero time. We need an order of 0.1 seconds to identify our experience. 
Thus, the world needs some finite time to be defined. The world has to be stable at least on the 
scale of seconds. Locality of interactions in nature ensures that only the decomposition to wave 
functions corresponding to well localized macroscopic objects can be stable. A quantum state 
describing the superposition of a macroscopic object in separate locations with a particular phase 
evolves almost immediately into a mixture which has a large component with a different phase.  
This obvious fact is analyzed in numerous papers with a buzz word “decoherence”. 
 
8. The probability problem 
The most difficult issue is probability. The idea of parallel worlds is relatively new for humanity, 
so language and philosophy describing this situation is not well developed. Lewis (1986) provided 
some insight, but the philosophical issues related to plurality of worlds are far from clear.  
The MWI I advocate has no uncertainty, randomness, objective chance which makes the concept 
of probability difficult. In the collapse theory there is a clear meaning of probability: the event 
happened while it could also not have happened, in the MWI such meaning does not exist. The 
event happened in this world, but there is no alternative, it could not be otherwise.  I want to say 
that the traditional concepts of probability are not applicable in the framework of the MWI when 
we consider the outcomes of quantum experiments to be performed.  Every time we perform a 
quantum experiment and it seems to us that a single result is obtained, all possible outcomes are 
obtained, each in a different world. There is no meaning to the question: in which world I will end 
up? In some sense I will be in all. In no sense, I will be in a particular one.  
 
Still, we have to explain our experience of apparent random behavior and the frequency pattern of 
the results of quantum experiments. My claim remains that there is no difference between my 
experience if I live in one of the MWI worlds and my experience if I live in the only world of the 
Universe with collapses on every measurement. How to reconcile the difference between the 
existence of a probability concept and identity of experience? To avoid the difficulty there are 
proposals to introduce uncertainty in the MWI and provide the meaning for probability that I will 
end up in a world with a particular outcome. In my view, adding uncertainty to the theory spoils 
it. The wave function of the Universe is supposed to be the whole physical ontology and it does 
not have any pointer moving from one world to another. 
But do we really have a problem here? The fact that there is no meaning for probability of the 
result of a future measurement does not contradict the claim of identical experiences. The standard 
approach to probability is to consider events which will happen, but testing probability claims 
relies on records of experiments in the past. Frequencies of the outcomes of repeated identical 
measurements performed in the past. So even in the framework of collapse theory, probability 
assignments are confirmed or refuted by our experiences in the past. Thus, the difficulty of the 
MWI to introduce the concept of probability for future outcomes is not relevant. 
Assignment of probability for future experiment relies on an additional assumption even in the 
framework of a collapse theory. We assume that nature will not change its laws. Another way to 
make predictions about future measurement is to assume, that after performing the measurement, 
the frequency of the measurement results fits our probability assignment. This approach may also 
be applied in the framework of the MWI. We expect that within the world the frequencies of the 
results of past measurements will correspond to the probability assignment.  
 
9. Probability of self-location 
The counterpart of the Born Rule in the framework of the MWI is sometimes named the Born-
Vaidman Rule: 
The probability of self-location of an observer in a particular world is proportional to the measure 
of existence of this world. 
The (somewhat controversial) term of “measure of existence”, Vaidman (1998), Groisman et al. 
(2013), is just the square of the amplitude of the coefficient of corresponding wave function in 
decomposition of the Universal wave function (1). This rule explains correspondence of 
experimental data of quantum experiments with statistics predicted by the Born Rule.  
 
Probability is a very controversial philosophical concept. Frequency of particular outcomes in 
experimental records is just one approach. Another approach is readiness to put bets on the results 
of experiments according to their probability to happen. Since in the MWI all possible outcomes 
happen, there is difficulty to understand this aspect of probability. In 1998 I proposed a gedanken 
experiment which allows sensible betting also in the framework of the MWI, tightening the 
connection of the Born-Vaidman rule with the concept of probability. In my proposal, after 
arranging quantum experiment the observer takes a sleeping pill, Vaidman (1998). During 
observer’s sleep the experiment is performed and the observer is moved to various rooms with 
identical interior according to the results of the experiment. When he is awakened, he understands 
that there are several copies of him in different rooms corresponding to the results of the 
experiment, however, he does not know who he is and thus he does not know the result of the 
experiment in his world. He might be given the wave function of the Universe; he still has 
ignorance which allows him to bet. Awakened decedents of the experimentalist preparing the 
experiment have a genuine ignorance concept of probability, similar to that of an experimentalist 
in the collapsing universe. Only the questions are different: the latter asks: What will be the result 
of the experiment? The former asks:  In which world (defined by the result of the experiment) am 
I?  
Note that all descendants have the same information and thus provide identical assignments for 
probabilities of different outcomes. This allows to define a rational betting strategy for an 
experimentalist before the experiment. Instead of probability postulate he has the caring principle, 
Vaidman (1998), Greaves (2004): 
The experimentalist cares about his descendants in proportion to their measure of existence. 
The justification of this principle for our betting example is the following. Every descendant will 
have a genuine probability concept and would like to have a bet according to a particular 
probability assignment. Since the descendants will get the reward of the bet, the experimentalist, 
naturally caring for his descendants, has a rational reason to put the bet for the results of the 
experiment. Tappenden (2011) suggested (and I think it is a reasonable approach) that there is no 
need to perform complicated procedure with sleeping pill. It is enough that one can imagine to 
perform such a procedure to justify the betting assignment of the experimentalist who believe in 
the MWI. So, identical experiences lead to identical behavior, although the argumentation is 
different, which is not surprising in view of different world views. 
 
10. Deriving the Born Rule 
The betting assignments are according to the Born Rule or to the Born-Vaidman Rule. The rules 
are postulates which are added to the formalism of quantum mechanics of evolution of the wave 
function. In my view, addition of a postulate is well justified by its confirmation by our 
observations. However, I do not want to leave unnoticed a large and increasing effort to derive the 
Born Rule. Deutsch (1999) started a program (extended by Wallace (2012)) to derive the proper 
betting behavior in the framework of the MWI based on some postulates of Decision theory. The 
program encountered criticism of apparently circular definitions. The Deutsch-Wallace proof is 
complicated and it is not simple to understand what exactly is proved and what is assumed.  I also 
suggested a proof, Vaidman (2012). My work was triggered by Deutsch (1999) paper, but the proof 
is apparently different. It is based on symmetry and relativistic causality.  Apart from the fact that 
in the framework of collapse theory we have to postulate relativistic causality, while in the 
framework of the MWI it is part of the physical theory, my proof is applicable to both cases 
McQueen and Vaidman (2018). Very recently Sebens and Caroll (2018) proposed yet another 
proof. They say it follows my approach of self-locating uncertainty and relies on the assumption 
that action on environment cannot change outcomes of local measurements. This assumption is 
not very different from my relativistic causality, however, it seems to me that their proof does not 
hold. It is based on permutation symmetry and relies on a metaphysical approach to personal 
identity the justification for which I cannot understand. Sebens and Carroll manipulate the concept 
of probability of an observer to be in a particular world when splitting has already happened, but 
the wave function of the observer is identical in both worlds. Not only the mental state is identical 
(sufficient for numerical identity in Tappenden sense) and not only the wave function of relative 
variables of the body of the observer (which might happen in my sleeping pill experiment) but the 
whole wave function is fully identical in both worlds. The worlds are distinguished by macroscopic 
differences of other objects. In this case there is no matter of fact in which of the two worlds the 
observer is present, since it is present in both. See details in Kent (2015) and McQueen and 
Vaidman (2018). 
Putting aside the correctness of the proofs of the Born Rule, I argue that none of them can be 
considered as unconditioned on any assumption. For the Born Rule in the framework of collapse 
theories, we need an additional postulate about collapse. It is not part of the standard formalism. 
A priory it needs not follow any laws of standard physical theory. We need to postulate some 
assumption: in my proof it is the impossibility of superluminal signaling. In the framework of the 
MWI we also need an assumption. The physics part, the evolution of the wave function of the 
Universe has to be supplemented by some law connecting it to our experience. Here the assumption 
maybe considered natural and minimal: everything, including our experiences supervene on the 
wave function of the Universe. Then, physical laws governing the evolution of the wave function 
are relevant to our experience too, so we might claim that no additional assumption was made. 
Still, in all cases there is a tacit assumption that probability (or illusion of probability) depends on 
the wave function. 
11. Conclusions 
Today’s physics is a quantum theory and it enjoys unprecedented success explaining all observed 
phenomena. There are questions that do not have good answers (yet). Quantum gravity, dark 
matter, dark energy… It might happen that resolving these questions will require new 
revolutionary ideas. However, quantum mechanics apparently will remain to be the theory 
explaining electromagnetic interactions, the interactions which are responsible for almost 
everything we see in everyday life. Unphysical features of collapse are the main reasons for doubts 
that this is the final theory of nature. But actually there is no evidence for collapse. Apparently, it 
is just the philosophical difficulty to accept the consequence of accepting that there is no collapse, 
the existence of multiple worlds, that prevents consensus about quantum theory without collapse. 
It took time before people were ready to accept that Earth is not the center of the Universe. We 
also need time to accept that we are not unique and that there are many similar copies of us.  We 
need time to establish the connection between the well-established mathematical part of the theory 
and our experience. It is an unusual situation which we did not encounter in old physical theories. 
Philosophers should play an important role in this project since it requires a dramatic change in 
our world view. Observing the rapidly increasing number of publications related to the MWI in 
philosophical literature I can be optimistic. I am not sure that the large effort to find a derivation 
of the Born rule is justified (I doubt that the MWI has significant advantage here), but this activity 
leads to accepting legitimacy of the MWI by physicists, and I believe that its advantage as a 
physical theory will bring it to consensus.  
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